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Abstract: When natural resource revenues provide an important motive and/or
means for armed conflict, the transition from war peace faces three challenges: (i)
ensuring that the benefits and costs of natural resource exploitation are distributed
so as to ease rather than exacerbate social tensions; (ii) channeling revenues to
peaceful and productive purposes; and (iii) promoting accountability and
transparency in natural resource management. Aid conditionality can help to
address these challenges provided that three prerequisites are met: (i) there are
domestic parties with sufficient authority and legitimacy to strike and implement
aid-for-peace bargains; (ii) donor governments and agencies make peace their top
priority, putting this ahead of other geopolitical, commercial, and institutional
goals; and (iii) the aid ‘carrot’ is substantial enough to provide an incentive for
pro-peace policies. Case studies of Cambodia, Angola, and Afghanistan illustrate
both the scope and limitations of peace conditionality in such settings.
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1. Introduction
Official development assistance (ODA) usually comes with strings attached. Multilateral
and bilateral donors use conditionality to advance a variety of goals, some noble, others
not so noble. The conditions sometimes are spelled out in formal performance criteria, as
in the economic policy targets in International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan agreements.
Other times the conditions are communicated informally in the process known as ‘policy
dialogue.’ Whether formal or informal, conditionality makes access to assistance
contingent on actions by the recipient. Foreign aid seldom is a blank check.
The objectives of conditionality typically do not include the prevention or resolution of
violent conflict. The IMF and World Bank primarily use conditionality to pursue shortterm macroeconomic stabilization and longer-term structural adjustment. Bilateral donors
often use conditionality for commercial purposes, as when aid is tied to purchases of
goods and services from the donor country. They also may use it to advance geopolitical
aims, as illustrated recently in the United States government’s efforts to enlist support for
the war in Iraq.1 In the past decade, donors have also attempted, albeit rather sporadically,
to use conditionality to promote political reforms under the rubric of ‘good governance.’2
These conditionalities may affect the likelihood of war or peace indirectly. Proponents of
conventional macroeconomic conditionality sometimes claim, for example, that
neoliberal policies serve the cause of peace by fostering economic growth. On the other
hand, critics argue that these same policies not only often fail to promote growth, but also
exacerbate income disparities and social tensions.3 At the same time, trade liberalization
– a standard reform pressed by the international financial institutions – and the resulting
loss of tariff revenues can squeeze the fiscal capacity of governments to fund peacerelated programs.4
In principle, conditionality can also be harnessed directly to the objective of promoting
peace. Where there is a risk of violent conflict, the aid ‘carrot’ can be designed to provide
incentives for steps to reduce social tensions. In war-torn societies, aid can serve as an
inducement for conflict resolution. And where a negotiated settlement has been achieved,
donors can use ‘peace conditionality’ to encourage the implementation of peace accords
and consolidation of peace.
In practice, such efforts have been the exception rather than the rule, and where
attempted, the results have been mixed. Three constraints have contributed to this spotty
record. First, domestic parties may not wield sufficient authority, or enjoy sufficient
legitimacy, to strike and implement aid-for-peace bargains. Second, the amount of aid on
offer may be inadequate to provide a compelling incentive for the adoption of pro-peace
policies. And finally, donor governments and agencies themselves may not put peace at the
top of their agendas, ahead of other geopolitical, commercial, and institutional objectives.
This paper considers the scope for using conditionality to promote peace in an especially
challenging terrain: settings where natural resources – such as oil, minerals, timber, and
illicit drugs – play an important role in both instigating and sustaining violent conflict. In
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such settings, donors can make aid conditional upon improved government policies for
natural resource management. For example, they can insist that natural resources are
exploited wisely and that the proceeds are used to fund equitable development rather than
armed conflict. Yet large-scale natural resource revenues tend to undermine donor
leverage, since this leverage depends on the magnitude of conditional aid relative to other
funds available to the recipient. Moreover, because official development assistance is
generally provided only to governments, donors have few opportunities to use
conditionality to influence rebel groups that generate funds by exploiting natural
resources. Nevertheless, there are times and places where conditionality can prove useful,
particularly if it is applied in concert with other policy instruments discussed in this
volume.
The paper begins by briefly reviewing the relevance of aid conditionality for conflict
prevention, conflict resolution, and peace implementation. This is followed by a
discussion of some of the special challenges in applying conditionality in conflict settings
where natural resources provide major income to combatants. Three case studies are
presented to illustrate these dynamics: logging in Cambodia; the oil sector in Angola; and
opium and customs revenues in Afghanistan. The paper concludes with some
observations on the potential as well as the limits of applying aid conditionality to
address the conflict-resource nexus in what have come to be known as ‘war economies.’

2. Peace Conditionality
The term ‘peace conditionality’ was coined in a UN-sponsored study of economic policy in
El Salvador in the mid-1990s.5 The study recommended that in ‘postconflict’ settings,
following a negotiated peace accord, donors should tie reconstruction and development aid
to concrete steps to implement the accord and consolidate the peace. In the case of El
Salvador, the government’s failure to implement key aspects of the 1992 peace accord –
including the provision of adequate funds for high-priority peace programs, such as the land
transfer program for ex-combatants and the creation of a national civilian police force –
jeopardized the peace process.6 Hence the study recommended that the international
financial institutions (IFIs) – the World Bank, IMF, and Inter-American Development Bank
– should apply peace conditionality to encourage the government to mobilize domestic
resources to fulfill its commitments.
In a sense, the aid pledged at international donor conferences after the signing of a peace
accord is conditional from its inception, in that the accord is necessary to unlock the pledges.
Subsequent aid disbursements are inherently conditional, too, insofar as the resumption of
violence would trigger suspension of aid, and failure to make progress toward building
peace would jeopardize future aid commitments. Peace conditionality moves beyond these
all-or-nothing choices, in which the aid tap is either ‘on’ or ‘off.’ Instead it seeks to calibrate
the flow of support more closely to the peace process, by tying specific aid agreements to
specific steps to build peace.

4
Peace conditionality can be applied to reconstruction and development aid, but most
observers agree that it should not be applied to humanitarian assistance for both ethical and
practical reasons. Ethically, it would be untenable to punish vulnerable people for the sins of
their leaders. And practically, the leaders may not be terribly sensitive to humanitarian
needs. Since conditionality usually involves specific aid agreements rather than across-theboard cutoffs, there is room for flexibility in deciding what types of aid will carry what
conditions. A starting point for the application of conditionality is those types of aid that are
most valued by political leaders and least crucial for the survival of at-risk populations.7
Aid officials sometimes disclaim responsibility for engaging with the political issues of war
and peace. At the World Bank, for example, officials frequently invoke their mandate to
make loans ‘with due attention to considerations of economy and efficiency and without
regard to political or other non-economic influences or considerations.’8 Yet violent conflict
is not only a political matter: it has profound economic implications, too. For this reason, in
the case of El Salvador an internal World Bank evaluation concluded that ‘if tax effort and
the pattern of public expenditures have a direct bearing on post-conflict reconstruction, as
they did in El Salvador, it is legitimate to include these parameters in the conditionality
agenda.’9
The application of peace conditionality to fiscal policy is not a great stretch for the IFIs,
which have a long history of applying conditionality to issues such as budget deficit
reduction and trade liberalization. In the fiscal arena, peace conditionality simply
involves a reorientation of objectives toward the goal of building peace. In some cases,
this may mean relaxing budget deficit targets to permit governments to finance highpriority peace programs. In others, it means paying more attention to the composition of
public expenditures, the level of tax revenues, and the distributional impacts of
expenditure and taxation.10
Donors occasionally have pushed the envelope further, applying peace conditionality in
arenas beyond their usual concerns. At a donor conference on aid to Bosnia, a few months
after the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, European Commissioner Hans van den Broek and
World Bank president James Wolfensohn declared:
Developments on the ground should be constantly reviewed to ensure that aid is
conditional on the thorough implementation of the obligations undertaken by all
parties, in particular, full co-operation with the international tribunal for the
prosecution of war criminals.11
In keeping with this stance – and spurred by US legislation that instructed the US
representatives on IFI executive boards to oppose loans to countries or entities not
cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia – the World
Bank and IMF held up loans to Croatia in 1997 until the Tudjman regime turned over ten
indicted war crimes suspects to stand trial in the Hague.12 This remarkable episode
showed that where there is the will to apply peace conditionality, even for unconventional
purposes, ways to do so can be found.
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Peace conditionality can be applied at the local level, too. In its ‘Open Cities’ program in
Bosnia, for example, the UN High Commission for Refugees allocated reconstruction aid
to municipalities that demonstrated a commitment to the right of refugees and internally
displaced persons to return to their homes. The aim was to use aid to reward local authorities
who sought to implement the Dayton accord, penalize those who obstructed
implementation, and encourage vacillators to get off the fence.13
Similarly, the US Agency for International Development requires banks and loan recipients
in its private-sector lending program in Bosnia to certify that none of their officers,
directors, or principal shareholders has been indicted for war crimes by the Hague
tribunal. The contrast between the Congressionally mandated support for war crimes
prosecutions in the Balkans and subsequent US pressures on aid recipients around the
world to exempt US personnel from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
illustrates the plasticity of conditionality: its aims reflect the diverse, and not always
consistent, objectives of donor governments.14
In addition to supporting ‘postconflict’ peacebuilding, conditionality can be used in
efforts to promote the resolution of ongoing conflicts and to prevent conflict from
breaking out in the first place. The following discussion considers the scope for ‘peace
conditionality’ in this broader sense of the term as well. There is an important difference,
however, between the situation following a peace accord and cases where violent conflict
is actively underway or where there is a high risk of it breaking out. In ‘postconflict’
settings, the peace accord furnishes a set of benchmarks that the warring parties have
formally accepted, against which donors can judge performance. In preconflict or conflict
settings, donors do not have ready-made criteria on which to base conditionality, so they
must develop conflict-related benchmarks themselves.

3. Conditionality and the Resource-conflict Nexus
When natural resources provide a motive and fuel for violent conflict, the use of aid
conditionality for conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding faces special
challenges. Three broad tasks can be distinguished: (i) the need to ensure that the benefits
and costs of natural resource exploitation are distributed so as to ease social tensions
rather than exacerbating them; (ii) the need to ensure that revenues from natural resources
are used for peaceful and productive purposes rather than being used to fund armed
conflict; and (iii) in support of the first two objectives, the need to promote accountability
and transparency in natural resource management. In examining the scope for aid
conditionality to help address these issues, it is useful to distinguish among countries that
are at risk of conflict, actively engaged in conflict, and emerging from conflict.
Aid before conflict: Conditionality for conflict prevention
In countries at risk of violent conflict, the critical issue is how to prevent natural resource
abundance from creating or exacerbating social tensions that could lead to civil war. This
requires careful attention to how the benefits and the costs of resource exploitation are
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distributed across the population, in terms of both ‘vertical equity’ between rich and poor
and ‘horizontal equity’ across ethnic, religious, regional lines.15 Natural resources are often
concentrated in certain regions of a country, as in the case of oil in Nigeria or minerals in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. If residents of these regions do not receive a fair share of
the benefits of resource extraction – while often being burdened with its environmental costs
– resentments can fuel violence.16 At the same time, if the other regions do not receive some
share of the benefits, this too can give rise to tensions.
Aid conditionality can seek to ensure a transparent and equitable distribution of the benefits
and costs of resource extraction. The scope for conditionality is greatest when aid is needed
to finance public infrastructure, such as roads, to access to the resources, or when privatesector firms are unwilling to invest without the guarantees and legitimacy provided by donor
involvement, as in the case of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline. As the latter case illustrates,
however, even when agreements are reached on the distribution and uses of resource
revenues, the enforcement of these agreements can prove difficult.17
Aid during conflict: Conditionality for conflict resolution
In wartime, a key issue is how to curtail the use of natural resource revenues to fund
armed groups, including both government and rebel forces. The potential for
conditionality to address this is limited, however, since during conflicts the volume of
development aid relative to other resources tends to be small. Apart from humanitarian
assistance, flows of aid are typically disrupted; and at the same time, combatants often
can make money by seizing assets, including natural resources. Yet opportunities for
conditionality can arise, especially in times of declining resource prices, as in Angola in
late 1990s (see below).
Any donor leverage is mainly on the government side, since governments receive ODA
while rebels typically do not. There may be some scope for conditionality in curtailing
resources-for-arms deals by rebel forces too, when neighboring countries are involved in
the trade, particularly if the governments of these countries value good relations with the
donor community. In Cambodia, for example, as discussed below, international pressures
on the Thai government played an important role in curtailing timber revenues to the
Khmer Rouge after the latter defected from the Cambodian peace accords. Similarly, the
UN Expert Panel on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has called for reductions
in budget support and stabilization lending to neighboring governments that host
individuals, firms, and financial institutions involved in the illicit exploitation of the
DRC’s natural resources.18
Aid in ‘postconflict’ settings: Conditionality for peacebuilding
A negotiated peace accord can chart the transition from war to peace, but whether the
country will reach this destination remains uncertain. The contests for power that
precipitated war do not disappear with the signing of an accord, and the risks of renewed
violence can remain high for many years.19 At best, a peace accord marks the beginning
of the peacebuilding process. At worst, it merely turns out to be a temporary ceasefire.
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In such settings, optimistically called ‘postconflict’ transitions, conditionality can play a
particularly important role. The large sums of aid pledged for postconflict reconstruction
and development – often billions of dollars – give the donors considerable leverage.
Conditionality can help to address all three natural resource management issues:
distributional equity, the use of revenues for peaceful development rather than military
purposes, and the promotion of greater transparency and accountability.
The case studies presented in the following sections illustrate both the potential and the
limitations of aid conditionality in addressing the resource-conflict nexus. They also
illustrate the slipperiness of the distinction between conflict and ‘postconflict’ settings:
all three countries have seen peace accords followed by fresh outbreaks of violence.

4. Cambodia: The ‘Logs of War’
Cambodia’s natural resources – rubies, fish, rubber, and above all, timber – have been a
major source of funding for the country’s armed combatants. The export of logs for guns
and profit became particularly important as external military aid was withdrawn after the
1991 Paris Peace Agreement among the Vietnamese-backed Cambodian People’s Party
(CPP), the royalists, and the Khmer Rouge (KR).
The scale of the timber trade and the identities of its key players have been carefully
documented over the years by Global Witness, a London-based non-governmental
organization dedicated to investigating the links between natural resource exploitation
and human rights abuses. In the mid-1990s, Global Witness reported on the tacit
cooperation in logging operations between government authorities and the KR, which had
repudiated the peace agreement and returned to war. These reports, and lobbying efforts
based on them, prompted the aid donors to attempt to curb logging by both sides.
The logging operations of the KR were conducted in partnership with powerful elements
in Thailand’s military forces.20 While the donors lacked direct leverage vis-à-vis the KR,
they could bring pressure to bear on the Thai government to take steps to end the trade.
After the US Congress passed legislation that threatened to terminate military assistance
to Thailand in 1996 and to terminate all assistance in 1997, and the IMF cancelled part of
a loan to Thailand, the Thai government moved to close the border and block further
trade with the KR, steps that ‘significantly contributed to the demise of the Khmer Rouge
movement.’21
Aid donors have also attempted to curb nominally ‘illegal’ logging activities on territories
controlled by the Cambodian government, not only because they finance quasiautonomous military units and because deforestation imposes high human and
environmental costs, but also because the donors are understandably reluctant to provide
budgetary support to the government when substantial forestry revenues remain off-thebooks. ‘Overall, the diversion of public resources has probably reached the same amount
as actual budget revenue collections,’ IMF representative Hubert Neiss informed the
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donors’ Consultative Group for Cambodia in July 1997. Neiss claimed that illegal
logging was responsible for ‘well over $100 million’ in lost revenues in the previous
year, and declared this to be ‘the single most critical issue in Cambodia.’22 The IMF had
demonstrated its displeasure over the forestry issue by repeatedly delaying and freezing
loan disbursements, and ultimately suspending them altogether, in response to the
Cambodian government’s failure to meet the revenue targets specified in its loan
agreement. Neiss announced that IMF aid would be resumed only when the government
took steps to halt illicit logging and bring legitimate logging revenues into the
government budget.
Other donors offered verbal support to the IMF’s concerns, but they did not follow suit
by cutting aid. Their timidity that can be explained, at least in part, by their desire to
maintain cordial relations with the Cambodian government. After criticizing the
government for human rights abuses, the Australian ambassador had become the target of
a scurrilous rumor campaign in Phnom Penh, and more importantly, Australian firms
were cut out of business deals. The lesson was not lost on other members of the
diplomatic community. ‘What is important for many of these ambassadors is to defend
their few miserable contracts,’ a senior UN official in Cambodia complained. ‘It is as if
they represent their companies rather than their countries.’23 In donor priorities, short-run
commercial interests can loom larger than the long-run goal of building a durable peace.
In mid-1997, violent clashes broke out between the CPP and the royalists, and their
coalition government collapsed. More aid cutoffs soon followed. Global Witness reported
that this ‘coup d’état’ was ‘primarily funded by logging revenue,’ and that for the next
two years militias allied with the ruling party ‘were given carte blanche to log anywhere
they chose and keep the money.’24
After a Japanese-brokered agreement that led to fresh elections and a new coalition
government, the donors pledged renewed aid to Cambodia in 1999. In response to
continued donor pressures, the government launched a crackdown on illegal logging. But
the crackdown primarily targeted ‘small loggers and unruly political clients, rather than
key forest concessionaires.’25 In an unusual arrangement backed by the donors, the
government contracted Global Witness to act as an independent forestry monitor, funded
by the British government’s Department for International Development. Despite repeated
declarations of good intentions by the authorities – including an official suspension of all
logging operations in late 2001 – Global Witness reported in mid-2002 that illegal
logging ‘is still taking place throughout Cambodia.’26
Senior Cambodian leaders have been unhappy about these pressures for reform, and at
times they have openly played the commercial-relations card in an effort to pit bilateral
donors against each other. ‘Japan is taking a lead,’ a Cambodian commerce ministry
official declared in 1999, while denouncing conditions on US aid. ‘By the time the US
shapes up, if a US company is bidding on a contract against a Japanese company, do you
think the US will win? I don’t think so.’27
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The efforts of aid donors to rein in the ‘logs of war’ in Cambodia, through formal
performance criteria in the case of the IMF and the informal policy dialogue in the case
of bilateral agencies, have not been a resounding success. But neither have they been a
complete failure. The IMF’s leading role in this effort has been made easier by the fact
that the logging revenue issue can be packaged as a matter of fiscal responsibility, rather
than as a political question. Yet the political ramifications are obvious, given the close
interconnections between incomes from the timber trade and political power backed by
arms. In the case of the Khmer Rouge, third-party conditionality helped to cut off sales of
timber to the Thai market. On the government side, progress has been slow, often
frustratingly so; in April 2003, for example, the Cambodian government terminated
Global Witness’ official role as independent monitor.28 Yet without the restraining
influence of international pressures, backed by formal and informal conditionality, the
pillage of Cambodia’s forests might have been even more rapacious.

5. Angola: Oil for Blood
Angola’s natural resource revenues played a key role in sustaining the decades-long war
between the ruling Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The conflict, which began before
Angola’s independence from Portugal in 1975, reflected class and ethnic divisions,
particularly between the Luanda-based mestiço elites who dominated the MPLA and the
impoverished Ovimbundu of the central highlands where UNITA found support.29 The
fighting continued – with brief interruptions by abortive peace accords – until the death
of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in 2002. To fund the war, the MPLA relied on oil
revenues along with backing from the Soviet Union and Cuba; UNITA relied on diamond
revenues along with backing from the United States and South Africa. With the end of
the cold war and the fall of South Africa’s apartheid regime, support from these foreign
sponsors dried up, making oil and diamond revenues all the more crucial. ‘The relative
value of the controlled resources,’ a World Bank report observes, ‘largely explained the
relative strength of the opposing armies.’30
UNITA reportedly obtained at least $3.7 billion from diamond sales between 1992 and
1998. Oil revenues received by the MPLA government are estimated to have ranged from
$1 billion to $3 billion per year in the 1990s, the exact amount being unknown since
much of it escaped recording in the government’s books.31 Oil revenues take three main
forms: (i) oil taxes, which reached about $3 billion/year in 2000 and 2001; (ii) ‘signature
bonuses,’ one-time payments by oil companies in return for development rights, which
reportedly totaled $879 million in 1999; and (iii) oil-backed loans, whereby the
government in effect mortgages its future oil revenues, which reportedly amounted to
$3.5 billion in 2000-01.32
The rest of the Angolan economy is a shambles. ‘Over the last 35 years, economic
activity collapsed in almost all sectors except oil and diamonds,’ the World Bank reports.
‘As a result, the non-mineral economy virtually disappeared as a contributor to national
output and a source of foreign exchange.’33 For example, the production of coffee,

10
Angola’s principal export before the war, has plummeted from 400,000 tons per year to
2,000 tons.34 The country’s per capita income is less than half its pre-independence level.
The human toll of the conflict has also been huge: roughly 750,000 deaths, 445,000
refugees, and 4.1 million internally displaced persons in a total population of about 12
million.35 Save the Children Fund recently called Angola ‘the worst place on earth to be a
child.’36
In addition to funding for arms purchases and payments to combatants, Angolan oil and
diamond revenues allowed senior leaders to amass great personal wealth. Global Witness
traced $1.1 billion, apparently derived from Angolan oil revenues, to a single bank
account in the British Virgin Islands.37 A March 2003 World Bank document provides
this frank assessment:
Since independence, the availability of oil and diamond revenues in a conflict
environment has created tremendous opportunities for corruption. Privileged
access to state contracts, regulatory agencies, foreign partnerships, elite health and
education facilities, privatized state assets, and subsidized credit and foreign
currency enriched a few at the expense of the many. It also resulted in a hugely
inefficient allocation of resources; high levels of consumption; and a business
climate characterized by favoritism, kickbacks, connected transactions, and other
distortive and non-transparent practices. In addition, severe weaknesses in
Angola’s fiduciary framework have led to the occurrence of very large
unexplained discrepancies in the country’s fiscal accounts, varying from 2 to 23
percent of GDP between 1997 and 2002. It has been estimated that total
unexplained discrepancies in 2001 amounted to 10% of GDP, or more than $900
million.38
The international campaign against ‘conflict diamonds,’ and the imposition of a UN
Security Council mandated sanctions regime, curtailed UNITA’s access to international
markets.39 Other policy instruments are needed to address the issue of ‘conflict oil,’
however, since the oil revenues flow to an internationally recognized government. Aid
conditionality is one such instrument, but it is not a terribly potent one since Angola’s oil
revenues greatly exceed the amount of aid on offer.
The World Bank began lending to Angola in 1991, after the signing of the Bicesse peace
accord, which broke down the following year. In 1995, after the new Lusaka accord, an
international donor conference for Angola was held in Brussels, yielding pledges of more
than $1 billion in development assistance. ‘These funds were subsequently held back,’
the World Bank reports, ‘due to insufficient progress in the peace process and lack of a
clear reform agenda.’40 In July 1995 the IMF began a Staff-Monitored Program (SMP), a
move that could pave the way for IMF lending, but it was ‘seriously off-track’ by the end
of the year.41
To obtain financing from private-sector creditors, the government has relied on oilbacked loans, a practice that dates from the mid-1980s. The state oil company Sonangol
has set up offshore ‘escrow’ accounts into which income from oil shipments is deposited;
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oil-backed loans are repaid from these accounts, bypassing the Angolan financial
system.42 ‘Because of high interest rates, typically 2 percentage points above Libor [the
London inter-bank offer rate], and safe repayment structures,’ The Financial Times
reports, ‘the banks’ appetites for these oil-backed loans are voracious.’43 The IMF
estimates that oil-backed loans comprised one-third of Angola’s total debt at the end of
1999. The government has limited its debt-service payments to these private loans and
some of its debts to multilateral creditors; new lending from bilateral and multilateral
creditors is ‘virtually shut off’ with accumulated arrears of more than $4 billion.44
The world oil price slump in 1998-99 made the Angolan government more receptive to
donor pressures for reform, at least temporarily. The IMF launched a new SMP in April
2000, under which the government agreed to increase expenditures on education (from
4.8% of total spending in 1999 to 12.5% in 2000) and health (from 2.8% to 9.3%) and to
hire an international auditing firm to undertake a ‘diagnostic study’ of the oil sector.45
Successful completion of these steps reportedly would have opened the door to a $75
million emergency loan from the IMF, and to a rescheduling of external debts to bilateral
creditors, permitting new borrowing on more favorable terms than the oil-backed private
loans.46
The international accounting firm KPMG was awarded a $1.6 million contract to conduct
the oil diagnostic study, funded jointly by the Angolan government and the World Bank.
The aim of the study was simply to examine discrepancies between projected oil
revenues and the revenues actually deposited in Angola’s central bank over the 18-month
period from mid-2000 to end-2001. Its mandate did not extend to the actual use of
revenues, nor to a retroactive accounting of oil revenues in the 1990s.47 In these respects,
the study represented a small step toward greater transparency.
The Angolan government’s willingness to accommodate the donors faded as oil prices
rebounded. A 2002 IMF report, leaked to the press after its publication was blocked by
the Angolan government, found that more than $900 million in oil revenues was missing
from state coffers in 2001 – roughly three times the total value of humanitarian aid to
Angola – and that $4 billion had gone missing over the previous five years.48
Savimbi’s death in February 2002 opened the way for the signing of a Memorandum of
Understanding between the government and UNITA representatives two months later, in
which both sides agreed to a cessation of hostilities. This agreement may mark the end of
the road for UNITA, but whether it will provide the basis of a lasting peace remains to be
seen. Resources are desperately needed to address the needs of ex-combatants, internally
displaced persons, and other vulnerable groups, and to redress the historic disparities
between the Luanda-based elite and the rest of the country, particularly the Ovimbundu in
the central highlands. ‘If these disparities are not dealt with,’ a report by the International
Crisis Group warns, ‘more organised and strident opposition may eventually coalesce,
whether through UNITA or some other political group.’49
With the end of the war, the government may feel somewhat more inclined to undertake
reforms, both to enhance its public image in advance of elections and to induce the
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donors to convene an international conference to pledge aid for reconstruction and
development. An agreement with the IMF on a reform program is widely seen as
precondition for significant reconstruction aid.50 Reflecting this generalized though
informal conditionality, a report by the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council
observes that ‘a redirection of expenditures by the Government towards the social sectors
will make it easier to advocate for complementary funding from the international donor
community.’51
More specific conditionalities are set out in the World Bank’s ‘transitional support
strategy’ (TSS) for Angola, initiated in March 2003. The TSS seeks to promote greater
transparency and efficiency in public resource management, to support the delivery of
services to war-affected groups and vulnerable populations, and to prepare the ground for
‘pro-poor economic growth.’ The Bank’s strategy explicitly incorporates conditionality in
support of this agenda:
Further lending in outer years would be triggered by decisive progress against
selected indicators, including satisfactory implementation of the demobilization
program, completion of the oil sector diagnostic study, and a substantial reduction
in extra-budgetary and quasi-fiscal outlays. Alternatively, in the event that
conflict re-emerges or governance deteriorates, impeding service delivery and
even modest economic reform, the Bank would continue to support AAA
[analytical and advisory activities] but new lending would cease and a gradual
disengagement would begin.52
Although the scope for aid conditionality in Angola has improved since the cessation of
hostilities with UNITA, the leverage that donors can bring to bear on the government
continues to be constrained by the availability of easy oil money. ‘The IMF is holding out
carrots,’ explains one observer, while ‘industry is holding out T-bone steaks.’53 If there is
to be any realistic prospect of significant reform, complementary international actions are
clearly needed. These include efforts to promote greater transparency on the part of the
oil companies doing business in Angola, such as the ‘Publish What You Pay’ campaign
launched by Global Witness and the UK government-sponsored Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI).54 As always, however, the willingness of donors and
investors to press for reforms is tempered by considerations of ‘commercial
expediency.’55 Angola is now the seventh largest source of oil imports to the United
States, and in the next few years the country is expected to rival or surpass Nigeria as
Africa’s top oil exporter.56 The profits from the country’s oil are partitioned between
domestic and international actors. It would be misleading simply to identify the former
with the problem, and the latter with the solution.

6. Afghanistan: Aid on the Margins of a War Economy
In Afghanistan, too, natural resource revenues have played an important role in financing
armed conflict, particularly after the 1989 Soviet pullout.57 Over the last two decades, the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reports, the opium trade became ‘an
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integral part of Afghanistan’s war economy, with opium going out of the country and arms
coming in.’ UNODC estimates that farmers and local traders earned about $180 million
annually from opium in 1994-2000. Afghan traffickers, who buy opium in local bazaars and
then export raw opium and processed opiates, received larger incomes, estimated at $720
million in 2000.58 During its five-year war against the Taliban in the late 1990s, the
Northern Alliance exported gemstones – emeralds, rubies, aquamarines, and lapus lazuli –
mined in the slice of Afghan territory it controlled, and used the proceeds to buy ‘guns,
ammunition, rocket launchers, and second-hand helicopters.’59 Meanwhile, millions of acres
of Afghanistan’s forests were ‘stripped bare’ to export timber to Pakistan.60
If we expand the definition of ‘natural resources’ to include all fortunes bestowed by virtue
of location, then the customs revenue derived from Afghanistan’s ‘transit trade’ – the
smuggling of goods overland from the Persian Gulf to South Asia – should also be counted.
The profitability of this trade arises mainly from ‘policy-induced price differentials’ among
countries in the region, notably between duty-free Dubai and high-tariff Pakistan.61 The
transit trade was estimated at $2.5 billion per year in the late 1990s, with the Taliban
deriving at least $75 million annually from informal duties.62 Today, both customs revenues
and opium profits appear to be substantially higher than in the 1990s.
To date, the potential for conditionality as an instrument to curb these resource flows has
been quite limited. Three key prerequisites for effective conditionality, as noted above, are:
(i) domestic parties who wield authority with enough legitimacy to serve as interlocutors for
aid agreements; (ii) a ‘carrot’ of reconstruction and development aid that is big enough to
provide an incentive to shift from the war economy to a new peace economy; and (iii) an
accompanying determination among international actors to assign priority to the goals of
conflict resolution and peacebuilding. In Afghanistan, all three have been in short supply.
Rather than being able to reduce the profit margins of the war economy, aid has operated at
the margins of that economy. At best it has helped to mitigate the human costs of conflict.
To some extent, the first prerequisite – the presence of a party with whom to negotiate – was
met in the years of Taliban rule (1996-2001), although fighting persisted and the Taliban
never controlled the entire country. But with its repressive internal policies, willingness to
host foreign terrorist groups, and close ties to Pakistani intelligence agencies, the Taliban
never won international recognition as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. The
country’s seat at the United Nations remained in the hands of the Northern Alliance. This
choked off access to reconstruction and development aid; what foreign aid the country
received was almost entirely humanitarian assistance.
During this period, tensions arose within the international community over whether aid
should be used in an effort to modify Taliban policies. The ‘Six plus Two’ group, consisting
of government representatives from the six neighboring countries plus the United States and
Russia, established under UN auspices in 1997, pressed for changes on the political front.
The Afghan Support Group, an inter-donor body also formed in 1997, was divided between
those donors advocating a hard line (notably the US and the UK) and others advocating
greater engagement (the Scandinavians).63 Similar divisions existed within the UN.
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The ‘Strategic Framework for Afghanistan,’ adopted by the UN Secretariat in 1998, was
intended as a pilot effort to foster greater ‘coherence’ among the activities of UN agencies
by attempting to reconcile political objectives with aid objectives. It would have been hard
to choose a less promising terrain for such an initiative. The preponderance of humanitarian
relief in aid to Afghanistan meant that meant that many donors and NGOs considered it
unethical to apply conditionality. Moreover, it was doubtful that threats to withhold to
humanitarian aid would have much impact on the Taliban, for whom the well-being of
vulnerable populations did not seem to be an overriding concern. After much debate, the
Strategic Framework adopted a compromise whereby ‘life-saving’ aid was exempt from
conditionality, while ‘life-sustaining’ aid could be subject to conditionality, a tenuous
distinction that prolonged the controversy rather than resolving it.64
In the end, the Strategic Framework was widely regarded as a failure. Conditionalities ‘did
little to change the Taliban,’ one observer concluded, but they ‘undermined the effectiveness
of the assistance programme.’65 In addition to the paucity of aid to which conditionality
could be applied, reasons advanced for this failure include the business-as-usual mentality at
the aid agencies, which led to the ‘triumph of project over plan and agency over agenda’;66
the relatively large scale of other resource flows, including opium and transit trade revenues
and financial aid the Taliban received from Saudi Arabia;67 and the fact that the bulk of aid
was channeled through UN agencies and NGOs who often were reluctant to apply
conditionality, rather than being administered directly by the donors.68
Seeking a more substantial carrot, Francesc Vendrell, the head of the UN Special Mission
to Afghanistan, asked the World Bank to begin reconstruction planning for Afghanistan.69
Several prominent experts on Afghanistan similarly argued, in a paper issued by the Swiss
Peace Foundation in June 2001, that ‘conditional planning for reconstruction can function as
an incentive for both Afghan and regional actors.’ They urged the UN, World Bank, and
major donor governments to launch a ‘public diplomacy process’ that would stake out the
conditions for reconstruction assistance, and suggested that aid money be placed in an
escrow account pending an agreement.70 Whether such moves could have borne fruit in the
course of time remains an open question.
International pressures on the Taliban did score one eleventh-hour triumph: a decree
banning opium cultivation was announced in mid-2000, in advance of the October planting
season. The ban was remarkably effective, virtually eliminating the crop in provinces under
Taliban control, and causing great economic hardship for farmers who depended on it. The
country’s opium production plummeted from 3,300 tons in 2000 to 185 tons in 2001.71 The
Taliban’s prime motive was probably not to attract aid, but rather to bolster its campaign for
official recognition at the UN.72 The move was followed, however, by $43 million in
additional emergency aid from the US, and by a pledge by US Secretary of State Colin
Powell to explore ways to help farmers hit by the ban.73
The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, starkly
exposed the inadequacy and perils of the policies pursued by the international community
in Afghanistan in the past two decades – policies that can be summed up as opportunistic
support for armed groups in the 1980s and malign neglect in the 1990s. After the
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Taliban’s refusal to hand over individuals implicated in the attacks, the US-led coalition
intervened militarily, paving the way for the interim Afghan administration headed by
Hamid Karzai. Yet the international community has yet to break definitively with past
policies. Once again, armed Afghan groups have been enlisted opportunistically, this time
to fight al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. And despite pledges of aid for reconstruction and
development, little has materialized, raising fears that Afghanistan will remain trapped in
a war economy.74
In November 2001, the major parties to the Afghan conflict (apart from the Taliban)
agreed at a conference in Bonn to establish an interim administration, to be followed by a
new constitution and elections to form a new national government. Rather than a peace
accord, the Bonn agreement represents ‘a power-sharing agreement brokered by the
United States and the United Nations,’ one that ‘put control of the security forces in the
hands of one political group in Kabul, marginalized the largest ethnic group in the
country, and left local commanders and other “warlords” to rule their districts with
impunity.’75 In the absence of a central government with an effective monopoly of
legitimate force and fiscal capacity, efforts to use aid conditionality for conflict resolution
and peacebuilding in Afghanistan would have to have to involve bargains with local
military commanders and with governments of neighboring countries that support rival
Afghan factions.
So far, the needs of state-building have remained subordinated to short-term military
objectives. In first year after the Bonn agreement, 84% of international spending on
Afghanistan went to the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, 9% to humanitarian
assistance, 4% to the International Security Assistance Force mandated by the UN
Security Council to provide security in the capital, and only 3% to reconstruction.76 Not
only has the reconstruction aid ‘carrot’ remained small, but it also has been heavily
concentrated in Kabul and the environs, due not only to the urban bias of aid agencies but
also to prevailing insecurity in the countryside. The ‘bubble economy’ in the capital, and
the resulting exacerbation of rural/urban dichotomies, threaten to replicate features of the
pre-war ‘rentier state’ that helped to precipitate the Afghan conflict.77
The interim administration collected some $80 million in customs duties – its only
significant source of domestic revenue – in 2002. In the same year, regional commanders
are estimated to have collected more than $500 million in customs duties. In May 2003,
the administration launched an effort to persuade the latter to remit revenues to the
central government. President Karzai and Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani threatened to
resign over this issue, a threat perhaps directed as much at the international community as
at the regional warlords. US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage warned that the
warlords would face ‘some rocky times’ if they refused to comply. Initial efforts focused
on Ismail Khan, who controls the country’s most lucrative border post in Herat, and
Rashid Dostum, who controls northern oil fields and Soviet-built fertilizer and electricity
plants.78
Lacking the means of violence to force regional leaders to hand over the revenues, the
central administration is relying on its ‘moral authority’ to secure compliance.79 Its moral
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clout is circumscribed, however, by its own failure to accomplish visible reconstruction
and deliver government services. Observers compare the situation in Kabul unfavorably
to the success with which Ismail Khan has rebuilt roads and bridges in Herat.
Revenues are needed to build state capacity, but state capacity is needed to gain revenues.
In principle, foreign aid can help to provide a way out of this chicken-and-egg dilemma,
providing external resources so that the government can demonstrate its capacity to
deliver goods and services. In practice, however, the donors have channeled less than
20% of their aid through Afghanistan’s new administration, preferring to manage
spending the themselves or subcontract with NGOs.80
Meanwhile, opium production has rebounded. The UNODC estimates the total value of
the 2002 crop at a record $2.5 billion.81 This figure, equivalent to more than one-third of
Afghanistan’s GDP, is probably an overestimate, since it was obtained by valuing the
crop at the high price of the preceding year, but there is no doubt that the opium economy
is again in full bloom. The US and UK governments sought to use aid conditionality to
curb the trade in spring 2002, delivering an ultimatum to the Karzai government ‘to cut
off the drug trade’ to start the flow of reconstruction and development aid. Given the
administration’s limited power, this had a predictably modest impact. The US, UK, and
World Bank earmarked $80 million to compensate poppy farmers for eradicated crops,
but much of the money reportedly was pocketed by warlords who ‘fabricate reports of the
crops destroyed’ and have ‘a strong interest in seeing that the eradication program
remains a job only partly done.’82
At March 2003 meetings of the Afghan Development Forum in Kabul and the Afghan
High-Level Strategic Forum in Brussels, Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani sketched three
possible future scenarios. The first, the creation of a stable and relatively prosperous
Afghanistan, would require, he estimated, about $15-20 billion in international aid over
the next five years. The second, in which the country would become ‘another failed
development project’ lurching from crisis to crisis, would cost about $7.5 billion in the
same period, a level of annual expenditure roughly comparable to that in 2002. The third,
in which Afghanistan would degenerate into a ‘narco-mafia state’ run by criminal
syndicates, would have the lowest short-term cost, but the highest cost in the long run.83
By thus reminding the donors of their own incentives to provide aid, Ghani effectively
stood the conditionality debate on its head. In Afghanistan, as elsewhere, the problem is
not only for aid donors to induce recipients to put peace at the top of their agendas. It is
also for aid recipients, and others committed to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, to
persuade donor governments to do the same.

7. Concluding Remarks
Conditionality is seldom popular. Recipients naturally would prefer aid without strings
attached. Among aid donors, too, conditionality has fallen into disfavor in recent years.
Several studies have questioned its efficacy in promoting conventional economic
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objectives such as budget deficit reduction and trade liberalization, and have called for a
shift from conditionality to ‘selectivity,’ the preferential allocation of aid to governments
that demonstrate domestic ‘ownership’ of the desired policies.84 At the same time, there
have been calls to retreat from extending conditionality to non-traditional issues. Citing
recent IMF interest in poverty alleviation, for example, the Meltzer Commission
appointed by the US Congress warned in 2000 against ‘mission creep,’ and in response
the IMF announced moves to ‘streamline’ its conditionality.85
Whatever their merits, the selectivity and the back-to-basics movements are ill-suited to
addressing the challenges posed by violent conflict. To allocate aid only to ‘good
performers,’ in the name of efficiency, would be to deny it to many of those countries at
most risk of conflict. To await domestic ownership of pro-peace policies in a society torn
by conflict may mean waiting a very long time. And simply to ignore the risks of violent
conflict, in the name of sticking to the ‘core competencies’ of donor agencies, is a recipe
for wasting scarce aid resources, since war can destroy the best-laid economic plans.
Recent experiences in Cambodia, Angola, and Afghanistan suggest that aid donors can
use conditionality to support peace, even where links between natural resource revenues
and conflict makes this task especially challenging. In such settings, conditionality is one
tool by which the international community can seek to address several critical issues:
•

Management of natural resource revenues by governments: In places at risk of an
outbreak or renewal of violent conflict, a key task is to ensure that the benefits
and costs of natural resource exploitation are distributed so as to ease social
tensions rather than exacerbating them. As we have seen, this could turn out to be
a make-or-break issue in Angola and Afghanistan, where disparities between
urban elites and rural populations could interact with ethnic divisions to re-ignite
conflict. During conflicts, a key need is to curtail the use of resource revenues to
finance war, although there is little scope for conditionality when conflict has
blocked flows of aid other than humanitarian assistance. After the signing of a
peace accord, a key task is to encourage governments to channel natural resource
revenues into peace implementation. In all three settings, conditionality can be
used to encourage greater transparency and accountability in revenue
management, as the IFIs have attempted to do in Cambodia and Angola. Indeed, it
is hard to make a convincing case for unconditional aid to governments whose
leaders keep substantial revenues off the books.

•

Containment of ‘spoilers’: In many places, a key issue is how to deal with
‘spoilers,’ leaders of government or rebel forces who oppose peace agreements
and are willing to use violence to undermine them. In some cases, conditionality
can help to induce such individuals to cooperate with the peace process, a strategy
that scored some success in Bosnia.86 In other cases – particularly where the
spoiler ‘sees power as indivisible, holds immutable preferences, and will take
strategic advantage of any inducement’ – the challenge is containment rather than
co-operation.87 Here, too, conditionality can play a role when spoilers rely on

18
support from neighboring governments, as illustrated by the Thai government’s
curb on log exports by the Khmer Rouge.
•

Building alternative livelihoods: When the goal is not to redirect natural resource
revenues but to reduce or eliminate them – as in the case of opium production –
then a critical issue is the provision of alternative livelihoods. Again there can be
a role for conditionality, as when donors provide aid to farmers on the condition
that they stop growing poppies – the obvious caveat being that the aid actually
reaches the farmers, rather than being pocketed by local powerbrokers as appears
to be the case in Afghanistan. Conditionality could also be used to encourage
governments to create a favorable economic environment for alternative
livelihoods – for example, by supporting remunerative prices for legitimate crops.
The latter would require an about-face on the part of some donors, notably the
IFIs, whose economic policy conditionalities often have precisely the opposite
effect, requiring the lifting of trade barriers and removal of price supports to
farmers in developing countries, even in the face of competition from subsidized
producers in the industrialized countries.

•

Curtailing private loans backed by future resource revenues: The role of oilbacked loans by private creditors in Angola poses the issue of how to handle debts
that were contracted not to benefit the populace, but rather to finance warfare and
feather the nests of powerful leaders. It would be a sad irony if aid to postwar
Angola were used to repay these debts. Yet given the fungibility of aid – the fact
that external resources free up domestic resources for other purposes – the only
way that donors can prevent this outcome would be to condition their aid on the
repudiation of such debts. Selective debt repudiation would have a legal basis in
the doctrine of ‘odious debt’ in international law, particularly if done by a
successor government to the regime that contracted the debts.88 Again, support for
such a policy would represent a marked departure from past donor policies. But it
would have two salutary effects: in the short run, it would conserve natural
resource revenues for reconstruction and development needs; and in the long run,
it would serve as a warning to creditors that such loans are not risk-free.

At the same time, the cases discussed in this paper illustrate the constraints on both the
ability and the willingness of aid donors to use conditionality to promote peace. There are
serious obstacles on both the recipient side and the donor side of the aid relationship:
•

Limited leverage: The extent of donor influence on the parties to a conflict
depends on the volume of aid relative to other sources of income. Given the
practical and ethical objections to conditionality on humanitarian aid, the relevant
sort of aid is development and reconstruction assistance. In wartime, official
development assistance is often minimal, so there is generally less scope for
conditionality than in preconflict and ‘postconflict’ settings. And since ODA goes
to governments (or, with government permission, to NGOs), conditionality
generally offers little scope for influencing anti-government rebel groups, unless
they receive support from neighboring governments to whom it can be applied.
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•

Lack of authorities with effective control: A further constraint is that aid recipients
may lack sufficient power to implement the conditions. In Afghanistan, for
example, donor threats to make reconstruction aid to the Karzai administration
conditional on opium eradication are not likely to have much impact in the field,
where real authority is in the hands of autonomous regional commanders. More
generally, as also illustrated in Afghanistan, state capacities in postconflict
settings are often constrained by a lack of revenues, while revenue collection in
turn is constrained by the lack of state capacities.

•

Competing priorities of donor governments: History makes it all too clear that
peace is not invariably the highest priority of donor governments. They may
espouse conflict prevention as ‘a flag of convenience,’ but pursue other aims in
their deeds.89 Thus conflict resolution in Afghanistan has taken a back seat to the
‘war on terror,’ much as it was subsumed by superpower rivalry during the cold
war. Commercial interests also can exert a powerful influence in donor decisionmaking, as noted in the Cambodian case. Worldwide, roughly half of all bilateral
aid is tied to exports from the donor countries. 90 Conditionality is not welcomed
by firms seeking to win contracts, particularly if other donors do not follow suit
and thereby give their own firms a competitive edge. Similarly, when foreign
firms are engaged in natural resource exploitation – as in the case of the oil
industry in Angola – their short-term interests may lead them to oppose
conditionality on the part of donor governments, even where this could help to
foster a more stable environment for long-term investment.

•

Business as usual at the aid agencies: Within the aid agencies, a similar businessas-usual ethos can pose a further obstacle to conditionality. Individual aid officials
typically are rewarded for making loans and disbursing grants, not for holding
them up by seeking to impose tough conditions. In the annual budget cycles of
donor governments, agencies that fail to ‘move the money’ often find themselves
penalized by reduced allocations in the following year. Conflict-related
conditionality requires an overhaul of these bureaucratic incentive structures. The
performance of both individuals and agencies must be judged not in terms of how
much money they spend, but rather in terms of how effectively their aid supports
the goals of building and sustaining peace.

Given these constraints, it is evident that conditionality cannot offer a panacea for violent
conflict. No matter how favorable the setting, and no matter how committed the aid
donor, conditionality is not a magic ‘anti-bullet.’ Aid is at best one instrument in the
international community’s toolkit for promoting peace, and not always the most potent
one.
The absence of conditionality, however, can undermine efforts to prevent or resolve
conflict by other means. In the months before the 1994 Rwandan genocide, for example,
the international community was pressing the government to implement the Arusha peace
accord signed in the previous year. Yet the donors failed to cut aid in response to

20
mounting human rights abuses, leading the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to
Rwanda to conclude that ‘donors collectively sent the message that their priorities lay
elsewhere.’91
The question is not whether donors will send a message with their aid, but what that
message will be. It is not tenable to pretend that economic performance and foreign aid
can be divorced from questions of war and peace. Nor can aid donors disclaim
responsibility for the impact of their actions – or inaction – on the dynamics of conflict.
Although aid conditionality seldom will be sufficient to prevent violent conflicts, end
wars, or guarantee the success of peacebuilding efforts, it may be a necessary element of
broader international strategies to bring about a more peaceful world.
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